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Entry: What Mama Never Told You
About Being There
KATHRIN S. MAUTINO*
As I was going up the stair
I met a man who wasn't there;
He wasn't there again today!
I wish, I wish he'd stay away.1
This article analyzes the development of entry as an immigra-
tion concept, with special attention to those factors which affect
entry analysis. In addition to the legal status of the individual, the
purpose for finding an entry, Congressional intent, other laws, and
public policy play a large part in entry law analysis.
Quite often, governments and government officials wish people
who are here would quietly go away. Their wish may focus on
criminals, but increasingly their wish is leveled against aliens who
are physically present in the United States. This is not to say that
the government wishes to get rid of all aliens; some, such as out-
standing scientists and researchers, are encouraged. However, the
government, like many individuals, often seeks a scapegoat for all
problems. Throughout history, whenever the economy has faltered,
aliens tend to be blamed. This often leads Congress, which has au-
thority over immigration, to make sweeping pronouncements about
the kinds of people who should be allowed to remain in the United
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1. Hughes Means, The Little Man Who Wasn't There, in FAVORITE POEMS OLD
& NEW 362 (Helen Ferris ed., 1957).
States. These pronouncements often have harsh and unforeseen con-
sequences which courts and agencies are required to enforce. These
harsh consequences are one reason why the simple, five-letter word
entry has such a complex and historical meaning. Courts have looked
to the concept of entry and its absence as a tool to mitigate harsh
consequences, leading to a morass of apparently contradictory
holdings.
One of the complexities of entry law is that there are three classes
of aliens considered to be physically present in the United States:
2
those who are here legally,3 those who are here illegally, 4 and those
who are "not here at all."5 The seeming contradiction of having
someone here physically, but legally "knocking at the gates," is one
of the results of a long and convoluted interplay of laws, treaties, and
policies that have turned the simple word "entry" into a term of art.'
Determining whether an alien has "entered" or "departed" the
United States can have a profound affect on his or her fate. It can
affect whether the alien is deportable,7 excludable,8 has a right to a
bond hearing and release from custody,9 or is able to apply for other
immigration benefits. 10
2. There are, of course, many people who are outside the United States. These
individuals are not discussed in this article because, for the most part, the Constitution
and laws of the United States do not grant them access to our courts and justice system.
See, e.g., In re Cenatice, 16 I. & N. Dec. 162 (BIA 1977) (holding that aliens not
admitted to the United States have no constitutional right to due process, equal protec-
tion, or counsel); President Orders Payment to Mexico for Help in Repatriating Chinese
Nationals, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1448 (1993) (discussing payments to Mexico to
deport Chinese nationals stranded in international waters); INS Revises Policy for
Screening Haitians Interdicted at Sea, 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES 793, 794 (1991) (dis-
cussing the history of high-seas interdiction of Haitians and noting that between 1981
and 1990, of 22,940 Haitians picked up at sea, only 11 were allowed to apply for
asylum).
3. This class includes those here temporarily, pursuant to the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) § 214, 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (1988), as well as those here as immi-
grants, as provided by INA § 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (1988).
4. This class includes those who have entered the United States illegally by
sneaking across the border or lying about their status on entry, and also includes those
who have entered the United States legally, but have since violated the terms of their
status. INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1988).
5. This means those who have been paroled into the United States pursuant to
INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1988). As discussed in this article, the
parole status granted an alien has a unique interplay with both legal and illegal status.
6. See Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 641 (1954).
7. Pursuant to INA § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988).
8. Pursuant to INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988).
9. Only aliens in deportation proceedings have a right to have their detention
bond reviewed by an immigration judge. Aliens have remained in custody for years be-
cause they have not entered the United States. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States
ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (involving an alien trapped on Ellis Island); Barrera-
Echavarria v. Rison, 21 F.3d 314 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing a Cuban who entered the
United States in 1980 as part of the Mariel boatlift and who has been in INS custody
since 1985).
10. For example, suspension of deportation as provided in INA § 244, 8 U.S.C.
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As the first step affecting an alien's immigration status, the legal
history of the term "entry" provides a fascinating microcosm of the
very political world of immigration law. As the political nature of
immigration is not likely to change in the foreseeable future, it be-
hooves the immigration practitioner to be aware of "entry" analysis
so that future issues may not pass unnoticed. As a careful study of
the case law makes clear, there are three elements that must be con-
sidered in every potential entry: the legal status of the alien; the pur-
pose for finding an entry; and the congressional intent behind the
statutes involved. Without understanding these factors, immigration
practitioners often are confused by seemingly contradictory holdings.
This article will explore the fascinating legal history of the term "en-
try," and illustrate the interaction of the three factors listed above.
An analysis of the term "entry" should start with the statutory
definition. Excluding, for the moment, an exception relating to per-
manent residents,11 an entry is defined as "any coming of an alien
into the United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outly-
ing possession, whether voluntarily or otherwise." 2 This definition,
like an onion, has many layers that are not obvious at first glance.
These layers do not lend themselves to a simplistic categorization for
analysis. Hence, this article will take an anecdotal approach, point-
ing out trends and themes where possible and leaving details to the
footnotes. With luck, this will increase reading enjoyment while
proving a useful resource for immigration practitioners.
I. EARLY HISTORY AND OVERVIEW
Until 1875, there were no entry requirements for aliens coming to
the United States.' At that time, the entry of an alien was not an
§ 1254 (1988), is only available to aliens in deportation proceedings. Aliens have no
constitutional right to challenge exclusion or parole decisions. Amanullah v. Nelson, 811
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987).
11. This exception is the codified version of the Fleuti doctrine. See infra text ac-
companying notes 31-33, 236-63.
12. INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1988).
13. Prior to 1875, the only requirement to be a legal resident of the United States
was physical presence. In effect, if you could get off the boat, you were a permanent
resident. See JOYCE C. VIALET, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY (No. 91-141 EPW, Supp.
1991), reprinted in HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102D CONG.. 2D SESS., IMMIGRA-
TION AND NATIONALITY ACT 548, 550-53 (Comm. Print 1992) [hereinafter BRIEF
HISTORY].
issue because there were no grounds for exclusion.14 In 18751r and
again in subsequent years,'6 Congress chose to exclude various clas-
ses of aliens and passed laws relating to their deportation. 7 At the
cost of simplicity, grounds for deportation and exclusion did not al-
ways overlap. Thus, throughout the history of entry law, an alien
could be excludable but not deportable. Until the early part of the
twentieth century,' 8 this conflict between grounds for exclusion and
deportation was not as evident, because exclusion grounds applied
only to the initial entry of an alien as an immigrant, and not to sub-
sequent "reentries."' 19
In 1907, Congress made most grounds of excludability applicable
to "aliens" as opposed to "alien immigrants." 0 This change required
the courts to determine which entry counted for purposes of the
alien's qualifications to be in the United States: the first entry as an
immigrant (as in the law of 187521) or a subsequent entry.2 Analyz-
ing congressional intent, the courts eventually took the latter view.23
This meant that, although unforeseeable at the time, an alien's brief
trip outside the United States, whether for pleasure or for business,
might later trigger severe consequences.
The harsh consequences of applying exclusion grounds to any en-
try of an alien were not lost on the courts. They began stretching
exceptions contained in the statute24 and thus created new concepts
14. Grounds for exclusion are conditions which render an alien ineligible for ad-
mission to the United States. They are codified in INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988).
15. The law of 1875 declared prostitutes and criminals to be excludable. See Act
of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477.
16. Congress has amended or added to the grounds for exclusion many times, in-
cluding major revisions in 1924, 1952, and 1990. See BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 13, at
548.
17. Grounds for deportation are conditions which arise or become known after an
alien has entered the United States. They are codified in INA § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1251
(1988).
18. See infra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
19. See Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78 (1914). A reentry is an entry after admis-
sion as a permanent resident. This term became virtually obsolete after the 1920s, when
the term "entry" was held to mean any entry. Immigration Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch.
1134, 34 Stat. 898.
20. See the discussion of the statutory and legislative history contained in Lapina,
232 U.S. at 83-88. Earlier cases analyzing the law of 1891 include: In re Panzara, 51 F.
275 (E.D.N.Y. 1892); In re Martorelli, 63 F. 437 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1894); In re Maiola,
67 F. 114 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1895); Moffitt v. United States, 128 F. 375 (9th Cir. 1904).
See also Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.
21. See supra note 15.
22. See Lapina, 232 U.S. at 78; United States ex rel Ueberall v. Williams, 187 F.
470 (S.D.N.Y. 1911); Taylor v. United States, 152 F. 1 (2d Cir. 1907), rev'd on other
grounds, 207 U.S. 120 (1907); Sibray v. United States, 185 F. 401 (3d Cir. 1911);
United States ex reL Barlin v. Rodgers, 191 F. 970 (3d Cir. 1915).
23. See Lapina, 232 U.S. at 78; United States ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71
F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
24. See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text for examples.
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and law. The most important concept for our purposes is that of "de-
parture." Courts quickly realized that, if they could find that an
alien had not "departed" the United States, no new entry need be
found, and grounds for exclusion could be avoided. Although never
statutorily defined,2 5 the concept of departure plays a small but
nonetheless important role in the law of entry.
Along with the concept of entry came the concept of parole. 26 Un-
like its criminal law cousin, an alien requesting parole wishes to be
let in (the United States), not let out (of jail). A parole allows an
alien to remain in the United States, usually for a temporary period
of time,21 but without most rights granted under the immigration
laws.28 While an alien granted parole status is physically here, le-
gally the alien is considered to be still outside the border.29
Federal courts could not avoid the harsh consequences of entry in
all situations, however.30 In 1963, the Supreme Court created a gen-
erous exception to entry law for legal residents of the United
States.a" Where a legal resident makes a trip that is "innocent, cas-
ual, and brief,"' 2 and not foreseeable as meaningfully interruptive of
his or her residency, no entry is made. This exception is known as
the Fleuti doctrine and has been codified.33 Similar concepts have
been adopted for various immigration programs. 4
II. BASIC ENTRY
A common sense definition would hold that an entry is any cross-
ing of a United States border from a foreign place. At certain times
25. A departure is generally held to be a knowing and voluntary leaving of U.S.
territory. See In re T-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 778 (BIA 1955). However, a specific exception
was created for permanent residents in Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), and
has been codified in the definition of entry. INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)
(1988). The concept of departure is discussed infra notes 72-91 and accompanying text.
26. INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A) (1988).
27. Some aliens remain in the United States in parole status for years. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Lue Chow Yee v. Shaughnessy, 146 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1956),
afl'd, 245 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1957) (finding that the status of aliens originally paroled
into the United States in 1949 remained unchanged seven years later). See also discus-
sion of parole infra notes 183-95 and accompanying text.
28. Congress has provided that aliens paroled into the United States are eligible
for certain benefits. See infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905).
30. See infra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
31. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
32. Id. at 461.
33. INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1988).
34. See INA § 245A(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3)(B) (1988) (amnesty pro-
gram); INA § 244(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b)(2) (1988) (suspension of deportation).
and in certain circumstances, that is exactly what courts have held
"entry" to mean.3 5 This is the simplest definition, yet it can have the
harshest consequences. An example of these consequences is shown
in Zurbrick v. Woodhead. a
Mrs. Woodhead immigrated to the United States in 1924 from
Scotland. All of the members of her family either were citizens or
permanent residents of the United States. Mrs. Woodhead was gain-
fully employed in the United States until 1934, when she contracted
tuberculosis.31 Two months before she was hospitalized, Mrs. Wood-
head decided to take a brief shopping trip to Canada. She was gone
only for a few hours but the trip had severe implications. The court,
against its sense of justice,"8 found that she had "entered," and thus
was deportable. a9 Similar cases have involved a taxi driver who took
a fare to Canada,40 immigrants taking day trips to Mexico,41 a trip
to Canada for gonorrhea treatment, 42 and brief trips to Canada4
3
and elsewhere.44 As with Woodhead, many of these opinions recog-
nized the injustice of the unintended consequences of determining
35. In addition to the cases discussed in this section, see also Podolski v. Baird, 94
F. Supp. 294 (E.D. Mich. 1950) (finding a resident who made a short trip to Poland
made a new entry such that he could be charged with being a Socialist prior to entry).
But see Del Guercio v. Gabot, 161 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1947) (finding a U.S. national who
made a four-hour trip to Mexico prior to Philippine independence did not make a new
entry). See also cases relating to Philippine nationals discussed infra notes 158-63 and
accompanying text.
36. 90 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1937).
37. Active tuberculosis was a ground for exclusion as was the likelihood of becom-
ing a public charge. Woodhead, 90 F.2d at 991-92. These remain grounds for exclusion
today. See 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(b) (1993).
38. Woodhead, 90 F.2d at 992.
39. Mrs. Woodhead was deportable because she was within an excludable class at
the time of entry. Id. This remains a ground for deportation. INA § 242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a) (1988).
40. United States ex rel Medich v. Burmaster, 24 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1928).
41. Schoeps v. Carmichael, 177 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
914 (1950); Cahan v. Carr, 47 F.2d 604 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Cahan v.
United States, 283 U.S. 862 (1931); Ex parte Parianos, 23 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1928);
Del Castillo v. Carr, 100 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1938) (last day trip to Mexico counts for
deportation purposes).
42. United States ex rel. Doukas v. Wiley, 160 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1947). At that
time, gonorrhea was one of the grounds for excluding an alien from entering the United
States. See Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874. By admitting that lie
had entered Canada for treatment of gonorrhea, Doukas was admitting he was excluda-
ble when he returned. His only argument was that he had made no entry.
43. Jackson v. Zurbrick, 59 F.2d 937 (6th Cir. 1932) (few hours visit to Canada);
Woodhead, 90 F.2d at 991; Guimond v. Howes, 9 F.2d 412 (D. Me. 1925) (attempt to
smuggle liquor on return from brief trip to Canada); United States ex rel. Siegel v.
Reimer, 23 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.), a.ffd sub nom. United States ex rel. Fisk v.
Reimer, 97 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1938); United States ex rel. Ueberall v. Williams, 187 F.
470 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (brief trip across Niagara Falls); United States ex rel. Manzella v.
Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (trip to island in the Detroit River);
Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291 (1914) (brief trip to bring back a woman for an immoral
purpose).
44. See Guarneri v. Kessler, 98 F.2d 580 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 648
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there had been an entry.4 5 Similarly, aliens who were illegally in the
United States received no benefit from their stay if they left the
United States. 6
A. Simple Exceptions
Courts have used or created exceptions to the simple entry concept
whenever possible. Minors47 under the care and control of adults are
traditionally held not to have the necessary will to depart and reen-
ter the United States. This policy leads to minors escaping what
their parents cannot. A prime example of this occurred in United
States ex rel. Valenti v. Karmuth.4" Valenti entered the United
States legally in 1914. In 1924, at age sixteen, Valenti accompanied
his school class from New York on a graduation picnic to Canada.
Although his teacher made all the arrangements, Valenti had ad-
vance knowledge of the picnic location and was asked to contribute
to the cost. 9 The court, in finding there had not been an entry, held
that a schoolboy "is not possessed of freedom of action to decide
whether or not he will go. . . .He is under compulsion as if he were
in the school room." 50
The compulsion to attend a celebratory, non-instructional picnic is
difficult to envision.5 1 However, the courts have used the element of
control inherent in the concept of minors and legal responsibility to
(1938) (holding a two to three day trip to Cuba sufficient to find an entry).
45. See, e.g., Woodhead, 90 F.2d at 991. The court strongly urged the Attorney
General to use his discretionary authority not to deport Mrs. Woodhead. Id. at 992. See
also Jackson, 59 F.2d at 937 ("The case is a hard one for the appellant."); Guimond, 9
F.2d at 414 ("I am compelled to decide the case of these unfortunate petitioners under
the rules which Congress has provided.").
46. Madokoro v. Del Guercio, 160 F.2d 164 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764
(1947) (subsequent illegal entries are not excused by illegal presence); Ali v. Hoff, 114
F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1940) (for purpose of effective date of law, last entry counts); United
States ex rel Gagliardo v. Karnuth, 156 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1946); In re S-, 5 1. & N.
Dec. 668 (BIA 1954) (Philippine national who returned to the United States after 1934
made an entry in spite of initial status). But see Yukio Chai v. Bonham, 165 F.2d 207
(9th Cir. 1947); see also infra notes 196-220 and accompanying text.
47. These are normally held to be children who are unmarried and under age 21.
INA § 101(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1) (1988).
48. 1 F. Supp. 370 (N.D.N.Y. 1932).
49. Id. at 372.
50. Id. at 373.
51. However, the court found the compulsion sufficient to distinguish Valenti's sit-
uation from that contained in a decision by the Western District Court of New York.
United States ex rel. Kowalenski v. Flynn, 17 F.2d 524 (W.D.N.Y. 1927), involved a 16
year-old boy who, with friends, went to Canada for a picnic. The court found a new entry
was made upon Kowalenski's return.
find no entry or other mitigating factors when the alien is sent
abroad by or with parents.52 Unemancipated minors do not have
carte blanche to enter the United States, however. Other factors in
addition to entry or non-entry must be established by the minor
alien.53
Courts also have stretched statutory exceptions to protect legal
residents of the United States from the consequences of entries. For
example, a legal permanent resident who regularly drove from De-
troit to Buffalo and made a twenty-five minute trip from Detroit to
Canada and back to Detroit was found not to have entered or de-
parted the United States.54 The court applied an exception that held
that legal residents traveling from one U.S. port to another did not
depart or reenter, 55 thus finding that neither trip resulted in an en-
try.5" Other examples of courts declining to find an entry are rare.5 7
52. See In re Bauer, 10 I. & N. Dec. 304 (BIA 1963). A minor stepson accompa-
nied his parents on a military assignment to Germany and returned to the United States
at age 19. The court decided the stepson was an unemancipated minor who lacked the
volition necessary for the court to find an entry. See also Serpico v. Trudell, 46 F.2d 669
(D. Vt. 1928). Serpico entered the United States legally in 1908. In 1914, at age 14,
Serpico was sent back to Italy to complete his education. He studied full time, except for
I 1 months of service at the front during World War I. He was supported by his family.
After completing his medical degree in 1924, Serpico returned to the United States. The
court held that he was admissible as a returning resident. See also Toon-Ming Wong v.
INS, 363 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1966). At the instruction of adoptive parents, a minor en-
tered the United States on a relative's documents. Again, at the instruction of his adop-
tive parents, the minor made a six-month visit to Canada to assist a family member. The
court held that the minor was not barred from applying for suspension of deportation
[INA § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988)] and remanded to the INS for a weighing of the
factors involved.
53. See Toon-Ming Wong, 363 F.2d at 234; In re Sias, 11 I. & N. Dec. 171 (BIA
1965). In Sias, a seven-year-old U.S. permanent resident was sent to Mexico by her
father. At age 17, she wished to live in El Paso, Texas. The BIA held that irrespective of
whether or not she had departed and abandoned her U.S. residency, she did not have an
unrelinquished domicile in the United States to which she could return. Cf. Serpico, 46
F.2d at 669. Interestingly, the intent of parents to abandon their legal residency is im-
puted to minors. In re Winkens, 15 I. & N. Dec. 451 (BIA 1975); In re Zamora, 17 1. &
N. Dec. 395 (BIA 1980). In addition, the parent's knowledge of ineligibility to immi-
grate has been imputed to children. Senica v. INS, 16 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 1994).
54. Annello ex rel. Annello v. Ward, 8 F. Supp. 797 (D. Mass. 1934).
55. As quoted in Annello, the exception in the Immigration Act of 1924 allowed
legal permanent residents to travel from one port in the United States to another through
a contiguous territory without making an entry. Id. at 798. Immigration Act of May 26,
1924, ch. 190, § 3, 43 Stat. 154.
56. Annello, 8 F. Supp. at 797.
57. See, e.g., Ex parte Piazzola, 18 F.2d 114 (W.D.N.Y. 1926). The court refused
to apply the law of 1917 to a 1916 entry. See also Browne v. Zurbrick, 45 F.2d 931 (6th
Cir. 1930). The court interpreted the immigration laws and another law relating to judi-
cial recommendations against deportation to find no congressional intent to have a 10-
day trip to Canada make an individual deportable.
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B. Inadvertent Departures
For legal residents of the United States, inadvertent departures
and reentries were quite problematic prior to 1947. In most in-
stances, the inadvertency did not excuse the departure. 58 That policy
began to change when the Second Circuit decided Di Pasquale v.
Karnuth.
5 9
Di Pasquale, a legal permanent resident, purchased a train ticket
from Buffalo to Detroit. Unknown to Di Pasquale, during the night
while he slept, the train traveled through Canada. Judge Learned
Hand, speaking for the court, found it to be a capricious and cruel
game of chance to find an entry when Di Pasquale had no intention
of leaving nor any knowledge that he had left the United States.60
The Supreme Court affirmed this position in Delgadillo v. Carmi-
chael.61 Delgadillo was admitted to the United States as a perma-
nent resident in 1923. In 1942, he was a seaman on a ship controlled
by the U.S. War Shipping Administration. 2 In July of that year, his
ship was torpedoed and he was rescued and taken to Cuba, where he
remained for one week. 3 He was readmitted to the United States in
transit.64 Two years later, he was convicted of second-degree bur-
glary and charged with being deportable as an alien who was con-
victed of a crime involving moral turpitude within five years of his
entry.65 The Ninth Circuit, reading the words of the statute, found
that there was a coming from a foreign port or place, and thus an
58. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Medich v. Burmaster, 24 F.2d 57 (8th Cir.
1928) (taxi driver ordered to take a fare to Canada made a new entry); United States ex
rel. Schlimmgen v. Jordan, 164 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1947) (seaman who made a four-hour
stop in Havana made an entry when he landed in the United States). See supra notes 35-
46 and accompanying text.
59. 158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947).
60. Id. at 879.
61. 332 U.S. 388 (1947).
62. Del Guercio v. Delgadillo, 159 F.2d 130, 131 (9th Cir.), rev'd sub nom. Del-
gadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947). The War Shipping Administration con-
trolled the U.S. Merchant Fleet and was concerned with the transportation of supplies to
military outposts.
63. Del Guercio, 159 F.2d at 131.
64. Id. It is unclear why this was done since the facts do not indicate that he was
inadmissible as an immigrant at that time. A transit visa is provided to aliens whose
main purpose is to travel through the United States. INA § 101(a)(15)(C), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(C) (1988).
65. INA § 241(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1952). This law has been recodified
by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 as INA § 241(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (1990).
entry.66 The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Delgadillo's land-
ing in Cuba, and thus his "entry" into the United States, was unin-
tentional, and thus did not count as an entry. 7 Delgadillo was not
deportable.
This policy has become widely accepted but is not always applied.
Thus, a permanent resident who went on a fishing trip, got drunk,
and was unaware that the boat anchored at Bimini due to a storm,
was found not to have departed the United States. 8 On the other
hand, an alien who was voluntarily drunk and unaware of his depar-
ture was found to have departed.69 A permanent resident, whose hus-
band bought her a one-way ticket to Italy and placed her on the
plane at a time when she was mentally unbalanced, did not depart,70
nor did a military prisoner traveling under military orders or
guard.7 '
III. DEPARTURE, GENERALLY
Unlike the term "entry," there never has been a statutory defini-
tion of "departure." It has been left to courts and administrative
agencies to determine what constitutes a departure. As can be seen
from the previous discussion, the intent to leave, or the knowledge
that a departure is likely, is one important element.7 2 In addition, an
alien must be physically present in a foreign port or place and have
"entered" that place.
How much intent or knowledge an alien must have to depart the
country is unclear. As mentioned above, an alien who was volunta-
rily drunk and accidentally got on a bus to Mexico departed,73 but
an alien who got drunk on a fishing trip, passed out, and whose boat
was forced to anchor at Bimini did not depart. 4 It is difficult to
66. Del Guercio, 159 F.2d at 133.
67. Delgadillo, 332 U.S. at 391 ("[T]he exigencies of war, not his voluntary act,
put him on foreign soil." (footnote omitted)). See also Yukio Chai v. Bonham, 165 F.2d
207 (9th Cir. 1947) (alien illegally in the United States who traveled from the continen-
tal United States to Alaska and made an unscheduled stop in Victoria, Canada, did not
make an entry). Compare with the cases discussed infra part IX.
68. Savoretti v. United States ex rel. Pincus, 214 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1954) [here-
inafter Pincus], aJfg 114 F. Supp. 574 (S.D. Fla. 1953).
69. In re P-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 235 (BIA 1951). See also In re P-, 5 I. & N. Dec.
220 (BIA 1953) (alien who was not concerned with the destination of a ship made a new
entry upon its return from Bimini).
70. In re Farmer, 14 1. & N. Dec. 737 (BIA 1974).
71. In re J-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 536 (BIA 1949).
72. This element can be seen in the sea law cases discussed infra part IX. See also
Pincus, supra note 68, at 314 (asserting that a departure must be knowing and volun-
tary); Schoeps v. Carmichael, 177 F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir. 1949) (stating that "in order
for an alien's return to this country to constitute an 'entry' . . ., his departure must have
been voluntary, with knowledge that his destination is foreign" (footnote omitted)).
73. In re P-, 4 1. & N. Dec. 235 (BIA 1951).
74. Pincus, supra note 68.
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believe that the intended distinction is the degree of intoxication.
7 5
In some instances, courts have taken to extremes the likelihood of
entry into a foreign country. Thus, an alien sailor shipwrecked on an
uninhabited Mexican island was found to have departed because he
assumed the risk that he would be shipwrecked."6
Physical presence generally does not include presence on U.S.
ships, U.S. military bases, or embassies located in other countries.
7 7
However, an alien may be found not to have "departed" if the alien
does not leave her ship78 or does not enter the land of the foreign
country.1
The entry of an alien into a foreign country has thus become an
interesting concept often used to reach a desired conclusion. Al-
though aliens traveling by ship or plane who are refused entry in a
foreign country and are returned to the United States do not "reen-
ter" the United States, it is not clear how much of this result is due
to legal analysis and how much is due to treaties and agreements
with other countries.8 0
A more problematic question arises when an alien crosses a land
border into Mexico or Canada. Although inspection stations do exist,
there often are times and places where an alien can cross a border
without a formal inspection."' If true entry analysis were applied to
this situation, the alien would enter the country when she was free to
75. One distinction between Pincus and In re P- is that one is an administrative
decision and the other is a federal decision.
76. Taguchi v. Carr, 62 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1932).
77. See Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923) (U.S. ships outside U.S.
waters are only metaphorically part of U.S. territory). See also Letter from Michael D.
Cronin, INS Assistant Commissioner, Inspections, to Charles H. Kuck, in 69 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 399-400 (1992); Robert A. Mautino, Acquisition of Citizenship, IM-
MIGR. BRIEFINGS, Apr. 1990, at 1.
78. See United States ex rel Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 192 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir.
1951), rev'd sub nom. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953). The Second
Circuit held that since the alien left the United States voluntarily, he made an entry
upon his return. The Supreme Court found that he had not entered a foreign place, and
thus did not enter on his return. See also In re T-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 638 (BIA 1955)
(finding that an alien who was denied entry into foreign ports made no entry on his
return to the United States).
79. See the discussion of an INS policy memo, infra notes 87-91 and accompany-
ing text, for a description of the INS's position regarding what constitutes an entry into a
foreign country.
80. The United States, for example, requires airlines to return aliens without
proper documents to the country from which they left for the United States. INA § 237,
8 U.S.C. § 1227 (1988).
81. From personal experience, the author has crossed into Mexico several times
and has never been formally inspected by Mexican immigration authorities. This is espe-
cially true at the busy Tijuana/San Ysidro crossing.
mingle in the foreign society. 82 The Immigration Service recently de-
veloped a policy conflicting with this position in order to respond to
an interesting fact situation.
In response to human rights violations in China,83 Congress passed
and then-President Bush signed the Chinese Student Protection Act
of 1992.84 This Act allowed certain Chinese citizens and nationals to
become legal residents of the United States. Certain Chinese persons
could not qualify for the Act's benefits unless they left the United
States and reentered in parole status.8 5 Apparently, these individuals
would cross the Mexican border and immediately turn around and
request to be paroled into the United States.8" In a policy memo,
87
the Immigration Service's Acting Executive Associate Commissioner
opined that the individuals in question had not departed because
they had not applied for admission to Mexico, and thus were not
coming from a foreign port or place.88 Thus, because the aliens had
not departed, they could not be paroled into the United States. In-
stead, the Commissioner wrote, they should be allowed to reenter the
United States in whatever legal or illegal status they previously
held.89
This is a very interesting position. In effect, it protects aliens who
82. See infra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
83. Notably the Tienanmen Square massacre. See More on the Chinese Student
Protection Act, 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1321 (1992); The Chinese Student Protection
Act of 1992: New Dependent and Controversial Issues, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 929
(1993).
84. Pub. L. No. 102-404, 106 Stat. 1969.
85. See discussion of parole infra part VIII.
86. These individuals would request an advance parole document from the Immi-
gration Service. This document allows an alien to reenter the United States in parole
status after a brief absence. See INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)
(1988).
87. Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Acting Executive Associate Commis-
sioner, INS, to Dwayne E. Peterson, Southern Regional Offices, INS (Nov. 15, 1993),
reprinted in 13 AILA MONTHLY MAILING 35 (1994) [hereinafter INS memo].
88. The memo also indicates that if the alien were refused admission into Mexico,
the alien would not have departed the United States. Id. at 36.
89. Id. at 36-37.
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are illegally in the United States from inadvertent departures." Be-
cause discrimination on the basis of citizenship or nationality is ille-
gal unless authorized by Congress,9 ' this policy can apply, for
example, to a Danish citizen illegally in the United States who inad-
vertently crosses into Mexico and immediately seeks to reenter the
United States. Anecdotal evidence indicates that this has not previ-
ously occurred.
IV. LEGAL STATUS AND ENTRY
Although not always determinative, an alien's legal right to live
permanently in the United States is an important factor that must
be considered in entry analysis. Courts have noted that the interests
at stake are "momentous." 92 In the cases discussing inadvertent de-
parture,93 the aliens allowed back into this country were legal per-
manent residents of the United States. Those aliens who are in the
United States illegally are afforded less deference and fewer excep-
tions. Thus, for example, an illegal alien who traveled between De-
troit and Buffalo was found to have made a new entry. 4 Legal status
is not dispositive, however. Other factors, such as being an "enemy
alien, ' 95 can affect entry analysis.96
90. Compare this with the discussion of legal status and entry, infra notes 92-94
and accompanying text, and in particular Ward v. DeBarros, 75 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1935).
Also compare this with the discussion of inadvertent departures, supra notes 58-71 and
accompanying text. It appears that many of these cases would not have developed. Re-
cent correspondence from the Immigration Service suggests a backing away from this
position. The Service seems to suggest that the alien must not pass the foreign Port-of-
Entry in order for no departure to be found. See Letter from Lawrence J. Weinig, Acting
Associate Commissioner, Examinations, to Robert A. Mautino (Oct. 24, 1994) (on file
with author). Given the physical layout of most U.S.-Mexico crossing points, which do
not encourage the crossing from South to North-bound lanes, the logical conclusion is
that the situation does not occur frequently.
91. Congress often has discriminated against races. See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion
Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (discussed infra note 217). However, Congress has
passed laws to prevent individuals from doing the same thing. See, e.g., the employment
sanctions provisions contained in INA § 274B, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (1988).
92. Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878, 879 (2d Cir. 1947). See also Delgadillo
v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947) (stating that "[t]he stakes are indeed high and
momentous for the alien who has acquired his residence here").
93. See supra part II.B.
94. Zurbrick v. Borg, 47 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1931). A similar case and holding
involved an unknowing train trip through Mexico. Ward v. De Barros, 75 F.2d 34 (Ist
Cir. 1935). See also In re A-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 128 (BIA 1956) (finding an alien who
traveled to the U.S. trust territory Kwajalein Island departed the United States, even
though such departure was unknowing).
95. An enemy alien is defined by Congress during time of war. See infra note 118.
96. United States ex reL Schlimmgen v. Jordan, 164 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1947)
V. MILITARY SERVICE AND ENTRY
Policies other than those surrounding legal status often affect en-
try analysis. Those persons who are found to be assisting the United
States by performing military service are likely to be protected from
entry regardless of their immigration status. For example, although
not officially part of the military, Delgadillo's activities on behalf of
the War Shipping Administration may have encouraged the court to
find there had been no entry.97
A more specific example is found in Ex parte Delaney.98 Delaney,
who claimed to be a United States citizen"9 and was beyond the
draft age, enlisted in the Merchant Maritime Service during World
War 1I. 100 He was shipped abroad, saw military action in the Pacific,
and then returned to Long Beach, California. There was conflicting
testimony about whether Delaney had physically entered the United
States before the Immigration Service notified him that he was being
excluded. 10 1 The district court held, reluctantly, that Delaney had
made an entry.'02 The circuit court reversed, holding that the physi-
cal entry of Delaney was immaterial.10 3 As part of the Merchant
Maritime Service, Delaney was under military orders.104 Delaney
had no choice but to obey orders and leave the United States or be
subject to other punishment. 05 Thus, Delaney did not have the free
will necessary to depart the United States and could not be held to
enter it on his return.108 The circuit court held that "[t]he element of
volition is lacking in this instance."'0 7
Ex parte Delaney is interesting in part because Delaney arguably
had no legal status in the United States. 08 While travel pursuant to
(finding that an alien enemy who traveled from San Francisco to Mexico and Havana
and who left the ship in Havana, made a new entry upon return to the United States).
97. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
98. 72 F. Supp. 312 (S.D. Cal. 1947), a ffd sub nom. Carmichael v. Delaney, 170
F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1948).
99. Ex parte Delaney, 72 F. Supp. at 313-14. The INS denied that Delaney was
a U.S. citizen.
100. Carmichael v. Delaney, 170 F.2d at 241.
101. Delaney testified that he spent the night in Long Beach, California, before
reporting to the INS inspection shed the next day. Ex parte Delaney, 72 F. Supp. at 316.
102. Id. at 322. The court complained bitterly about the lack of justice in the
decision it was forced to reach. Id. at 321-22.
103. Carmichael v. Delaney, 170 F.2d at 239.
104. Delaney was assigned to his ship by the U.S. Coast Guard and received gov-
ernment pay. Ex parte Delaney, 72 F. Supp. at 315.
105. Id.
106. Carmichael v. Delaney, 170 F.2d at 242.
107. Id.
108. At the time of entry, the burden is on the individual to prove a right to enter
the United States either as a citizen or as an alien. INA § 211, 8 U.S.C. § 1181 (1988);
INA § 215, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1988).
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military orders may protect an illegal alien from making a new en-
try,L09 military service in other situations has not provided similar
protection. Travel to Mexico while on an authorized furlough o10 as
well as lying about U.S. citizenship status1  receive no apparent
ameliorative effect from compliance with the draft laws, especially in
connection with other violations of federal law.
112
VI. INVOLUNTARY ENTRY
To this point, we have discussed the status of those who reenter
the United States after a brief departure. However, much of entry
law involves initial approaches to U.S. borders. Usually, the alien
wishes to enter the United States; occasionally, the alien is here in-
voluntarily. These involuntary visitors bring with them policy con-
cerns that courts are willing to take into account.
A good example of this (as well as an interesting historical note) is
United States ex rel. Bradley v. Watkins."13 Bradley involved a Nor-
wegian member of the Quisling party" 4 seized by the U.S. Coast
Guard in Greenland almost three months before the United States
109. See In re J-, 3 1. & N. Dec. 536 (BIA 1949) (finding that a military prisoner
who travelled under orders or custody had not departed or entered the United States
since both were involuntary).
110. See United States ex rel. Rubio v. Jordan, 190 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1951)
(holding that an illegal alien who was inducted into the army and given a military fur-
lough to visit family in Mexico made a new entry into the United States upon his re-
turn); In re C- R-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 126 (BIA 1950) (holding that a permanent resident
granted a military furlough to attend a funeral in Mexico made an entry on his return).
111. See Werblow v. United States, 134 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1943). In Werblow, an
alien, who became a permanent resident in 1923 and served in World War I, sought
naturalization benefits under the Alien Veterans Naturalization Act. He was found not
to have established two years continuous residence as a permanent resident because his
last entry was on a fraudulently-obtained U.S. passport and not as a permanent resident.
See also Ng Lin Chong v. McGrath, 202 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1952). In McGrath, an
illegal alien falsely claimed U.S. citizenship when he registered for the draft in 1942. He
later obtained a U.S. passport and was paroled into the United States for prosecution
upon his return from abroad. The case discusses deportability, not excludability, thus an
entry was assumed to be made.
112. It is a federal crime to make a false claim to U.S. citizenship. INA § 275, 8
U.S.C. § 1325 (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 911 (1988). However, non-immigrant status is pre-
served during military service. In re A- I- C-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 630 (BIA 1952) (holding
that an alien student must be given reasonable time to return to school after completion
of military service).
113. 163 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1947).
114. The Nasjonal Samling Party is known outside of Norway by the name of the
puppet prime minister, Quisling, empowered by Nazi Germany after its occupation of
Norway in 1939. See, e.g., HALVDAN KOHT. NORWAY, NEUTRAL AND INVADED 16, 78-
79 (1941).
was officially at war with Germany and German-installed govern-
ments.1 15 During the war, Bradley was interned as an enemy alien.
At the end of the war, the government sought to deport Bradley to
Norway. The government claimed that he was an applicant for ad-
mission without proper documents. At that time, an immigrant (i.e.,
an applicant for admission) was defined as "any alien departing from
any place outside the United States destined for the United
States.""' 6 The court interpreted the statutory language to include
an element of volition on the part of the alien and found no congres-
sional intent that the immigration laws cover involuntary entries. 1
Bradley was not brought to the United States as an alien enemy. 118
Thus, the government could not use the regulations governing alien
enemies to secure his return to Norway.
A different situation existed in United States ex rel. Ludwig v.
Watkins."' In that case, Ludwig, a German citizen, was sent to the
United States under guard by the government of Nicaragua. 120 The
government sought to deport Ludwig to Germany at the end of
World War II. The Second Circuit found even fewer compelling rea-
sons to apply the immigration laws to Ludwig than it did to Bradley.
Ludwig was subject to the alien enemy provisions, which included
procedures for the removal of alien enemies found in the Western
Hemisphere to their native countries.' 2'
Later, the Second Circuit, following the precedents set forth in
Bradley and Ludwig, found that aliens expelled and forced on to a
United States-bound plane,"' or brought into the United States by
U.S. Immigration Service officers,' 2 3 also were not subject to depor-
tation. The court began creating law, however. First in dicta, 24 and
then in a specific holding, 2 5 the Second Circuit allowed an entry to
115. War was officially declared on December 7, 1941; Bradley was seized on Sep-
tember 14, 1941. Bradley, 163 F.2d at 329.
116. 8 U.S.C.A. § 203 (1945), quoted in Bradley, 163 F.2d at 330. Bradley's re-
luctance to return to Norway probably resulted from likely war crimes prosecution in
Norway.
117. Bradley, 163 F.2d at 330.
118. By presidential proclamation, alien enemies found in the Western Hemisphere
could be brought to the United States for internment during World War II. The procla-
mation provided for the aliens' removal at the end of the war. See the discussion of the
Enemy Aliens Act of 1798 and the presidential proclamation in Ludecke v. Watkins, 335
U.S. 160 (1948).
119. 164 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1947).
120. Id. at 457. See supra note 118 for a discussion of alien enemy provisions.
121. Ludwig, 164 F.2d at 457. The court stated that "[s]ince Ludwig was brought
in as an enemy alien the United States should treat him as such for purposes of re-
moval." Id.
122. United States ex rel. Paetau v. Watkins, 164 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1947).
123. United States ex rel. Schirrmeister v. Watkins, 171 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 337 U.S. 942 (1949).
124. Paetau, 164 F.2d at 458.
125. Schirrmeister, 171 F.2d at 860.
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be found after an alien had been provided an opportunity to leave
the United States. 126 Further development of this interesting ap-
proach was curtailed by passage of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952,127 which expanded the definition of entry to include any
coming to the United States "voluntarily or otherwise.'
28
Interestingly, courts have applied similar standards to aliens and
citizens forced to remain abroad during World War 11.129 It must be
noted, however, that the laws involved are not the same laws that
govern entry into the United States, and thus the analysis involved
has a completely different character.
The analysis of these and other cases finding an entry of enemy
aliens is very fact-specific. The concern seems to be with the activity
of U.S. agents abroad. Whenever there exists the least hint of voli-
tion on the part of the alien, courts have found an entry, 130 even in
the face of questionable United States conduct.' 3 '
Generally speaking, involuntary entry has not been an issue since
1952.132 Recent cases involving individuals brought to the United
126. Id. There was a strong dissent filed by Judge Swan, pointing out the incon-
gruity of finding an entry based on actions of a third party at a later date. Id.
127. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163.
128. INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1988). See also D'Agostino v.
Sahli, 230 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1956) (holding that an alien kidnapped by U.S. narcotics
agents, who were assisted by Mexican officials in Mexico City, made an entry when he
was brought to the United States).
129. See Nagano v. Brownell, 212 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1954) (deciding that a legal
resident who went to Japan to arrange marriages for her daughters and who could not
return due to the war was a returning resident, and therefore was able to regain property
confiscated pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act); Mendelsohn v. Dulles, 207
F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (holding that a naturalized U.S. citizen who remained outside
the United States in Palestine due to World War II, family illness, and financial inability
to purchase a ticket had a cause of action to sue under section 503 of the Nationality Act
of 1940, despite being out of the country for five years).
130. See United States ex rel. Schlimmgen v. Jordan, 164 F.2d 633 (7th Cir.
1947). In Schlimmgen, a legal permanent resident, also a registered enemy alien, worked
as a seaman. In 1939 or 1940, he left by ship for ports in Mexico and Cuba. He spent
approximately four hours in Havana. The court noted that prior to 1938, he spent more
time in Germany than in the United States and held that his next landing in the United
States was an entry.
131. See United States ex reL. Von Kleczkowsky v. Watkins, 71 F. Supp. 429
(S.D.N.Y. 1947). In Von Kleczkowsky, an Austrian husband and wife who spied for the
United States in Istanbul claimed that they had been promised new homes in the United
States. When their activities were discovered by the Germans, they were flown by U.S.
military aircraft to the United States where they were placed in an internment camp.
The court found their arguments that they were involuntarily brought to the United
States insufficient to find no entry had occurred. The court found them to be deportable
as aliens without visas.
132. The definition of entry now includes trips into the United States that are
made "voluntarily or otherwise." INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1988).
States by foreign agents 3 3 or by the U.S. military'34 have not dealt
with entry. However, even today, not all involuntary entries are en-
tries for immigration purposes. Treaties, especially extradition trea-
ties, may govern the status of the alien while in the United States.
Thus, an alien who is extradited to Canada makes a new entry upon
his return only on the condition that he is accepted into this country
as though he never left'3 5 because of an agreement between the two
countries.'3 6 However, while an individual who is extradited to the
United States from Great Britain has made an entry, 3 7 an individ-
ual extradited from Australia has not.138
VII. PHYSICAL COMPONENTS OF ENTRY
Up to this point, we have analyzed various policy factors that may
affect whether an entry is found. Now we examine the guidelines
developed to determine when an alien physically within the United
States has entered this country.
The current accepted definition pivots on physical presence plus
either inspection and admission by an immigration officer or actual
and intentional evasion of the nearest inspection point.' 39 Although
not always described in those exact words, the definition has existed
for some time.'
40
133. See, e.g., Steven A. Holmes, U.S. Gives Mexico Abduction Pledge, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 1993, at All; No End to the Mexican Kidnap Case, NY. TIMES, Jan. 2,
1993, § 1, at 20. These articles discuss the kidnapping of the killers of DEA agent En-
rique Camarena and note that other sovereignty issues are involved. The Mexican gov-
ernment does not take kindly to the kidnapping of its citizens without its knowledge and
consent.
134. See, e.g., Manuel Noriega, Prisoner of War, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1992, § 1,
at 22. Regarding the Manuel Noriega case, Noriega argues that he is a prisoner of war,
not that he has not made an entry. Should criminal prosecution fail, it would be interest-
ing to see if deportation or exclusion proceedings are brought.
135. United States ex rel. Consola v. Karnuth, 27 F. Supp. 461 (W.D.N.Y.), afTd,
108 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1939). The government tried to deport the returned alien as an
immigrant without a visa, based upon a new entry.
136. However, Consola was deportable on other grounds. Id. at 462.
137. Blumen v. Haff, 78 F.2d 833 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 644 (1935).
See also Rasmussen v. Robinson, 68 F. Supp. 930 (D.V.I. 1946), rev'd, 163 F.2d 732 (3d
Cir. 1947) (holding that a legal resident who was returned to the Virgin Islands by the
police made an entry).
138. Schuldreich v. INS, No. B-93-93 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 1993), reported in Ex-
tradition Treaty Affords Alien Right to Depart Voluntarily, Court Holds, 70 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 1562 (1993). Note that the alien was officially paroled into the United
States. See also In re O'D-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 632 (BIA 1949) (finding that an illegal alien
extradited from Puerto Rico to New York made an entry under the Immigration Act of
1917).
139. In re Pierre, 14 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 1973).
140. See, e.g., Lew Moy v. United States, 237 F. 50 (8th Cir. 1916) (entry is
actual and intentional evasion of inspection); United States v. Vasilatos, 209 F.2d 195
(3d Cir. 1954) (entry is inspection and admission); In re Dubbiosi, 191 F. Supp. 65 (E.D.
Va. 1961) (entry is freedom from official restraint and physical presence).
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Physical presence is the simplest of the definition's elements: one is
considered to be physically within the United States 41 or one is not.
Other elements do not come into the analysis without physical pres-
ence. Thus, an alien who was inspected in Canada, 142 but whose visa
was revoked before she traveled to the United States, did not
enter.'43 In contrast, an alien crossing a land border who was told to
"go ahead" but stopped after a few feet, had entered because she
was physically within the United States after her inspection. 14
Inspection and admission are normally defined as communication,
in a tangible manner, that the alien is free to continue his or her
journey. 145 This definition has been interpreted as requiring freedom
from official restraint, even if it lasts only momentarily. 4  Thus,
aliens who are physically in the United States but still in the port of
entry117 normally will not be found to have entered. 14  Similarly,
aliens in the custody of ship owners, 149 the U.S. Marshal,1 50 or other
agencies 51 have not entered the United States. Official restraint
141. The United States is currently defined, with exceptions, as the continental
U.S., Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. INA
§ 101(a)(36), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(36) (1988).
142. At certain airports, the Immigration Service has established "pre-inspection"
stations, allowing aliens entering the United States to avoid the inconvenience of inspec-
tion at a busy airport or other port of entry. 8 C.F.R. § 238.4 (1993).
143. In re Barreto, 15 I. & N. Dec. 498 (BIA 1975).
144. In re V- Q-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 78, 79 (BIA 1960). See also IJ Terminates
Exclusion Proceedings Against Chinese Man, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1133 (1993)
(discussing the entry of a Chinese national who escaped from a boat but was captured
moments later).
145. See In re V- Q-, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 79.
146. See In re Dubbiosi, 191 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Va. 1961).
147. The port of entry is an inspection point, usually at a land border. INA
§§ 238, 239, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1228, 1229 (1988).
148. Correa v. Thornburgh, 901 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that an alien
who had completed INS inspection but was detained in a customs enclosure of Houston
Intercontinental Airport did not enter); United States v. Oscar, 496 F.2d 492 (9th Cir.
1974) (holding that an alien directed to the port of entry's secondary inspection unit,
located within the United States, had not made an entry). But see United States v. Mar-
tin-Plascencia, 532 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976) (holding that
an alien who avoided detection for 50 yards across the border had entered even though
he was still within the port of entry facility).
149. See Case of the Chinese Cabin Waiter, 13 F. 286 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882); Ed-
mond v. Nelson, 575 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. La. 1983) (finding Haitians who were rescued
by a U.S. ship and held for INS inspections did not enter); In re Pierre, 14 I. & N. Dec.
467 (BIA 1973) (finding aliens who were held by a ship owner did not make an entry).
150. Klapholz v. Esperdy, 201 F. Supp. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), afd, 302 F.2d 928
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891 (1962).
151. In re Accardi, 14 I. & N. Dec. 367, 370 (BIA 1973) (U.S. narcotics agents);
United States ex rel. Camezon [Camazon] v. District Director of Immigration and Nat-
uralization at Port of New York, 105 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (finding that an alien
means no opportunity to leave. Thus, an alien involuntarily held on
board a ship while a search for stowaways takes place has not en-
tered, 152 but an alien granted a visa and free to leave the ship has
entered, whether or not he leaves the ship.5 3
Although citizens 5 4 and nationals155 are inspected and admitted
when they return to the United States,156 the immigration laws apply
only to aliens. 57 Because some nationals have become aliens, an-
other exception to the general entry law exists. Consider, for exam-
ple, the status of Philippine citizens. The Philippine Islands were
part of the United States until 1934, and citizens of the Philippines
were nationals of the United States. 58 In 1934, President Roosevelt
signed the Philippine Independence Act. 59 Among other things, it
stated that Philippine citizens were to be treated as aliens for pur-
poses of the immigration laws.' Although silent on the issue, courts
being held by INS District Director did not make an entry); United States ex rel. Pan-
tano v. Corsi, 65 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1933) (deciding that an alien who was brought to the
United States in INS custody, was released on a criminal bond, served 30 days in jail,
and then was returned to INS custody, did not make an entry).
152. In re Dubbiosi, 191 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Va. 1961).
153. See United States v. Vasilatos, 209 F.2d 195 (3d Cir. 1954); Lazarescu v.
United States, 199 F.2d 898 (4th Cir. 1952). For venue purposes, the port where a per-
son is free to leave a ship is where entry occurs.
154. Citizens are those born in the United States or those who meet the require-
ments of INA §§ 301-348, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1459 (1988). For an in-depth discussion of
citizenship, see Mautino, supra note 77, at 1.
155. Nationals are non-citizen individuals who owe allegiance to the United States.
INA § 101(a)(22), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (1988).
156. The burden is on the individual wishing to enter the United States to prove
that she has a right to enter (e.g., a citizen) or is qualified to enter (e.g., an alien with a
proper visa). See INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988).
157. Aliens are those who are not citizens or nationals of the United States. INA
§ 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1988). See also United States ex rel. Polymeris v.
Trudell, 284 U.S. 279 (1932), affig 49 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1931) (finding that the burden
is on the alien to establish admissibility); United States ex rel. Brancato v. Lehmann,
239 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1956) (deciding that where a naturalized citizen took a trip to
Italy and was later convicted of perjury and denaturalized, his entry as a citizen does not
count for immigration purposes). But see United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaugh-
nessy, 338 U.S. 521 (1950) (involving a naturalized citizen who took a short trip and was
then convicted of conspiracy and denaturalized, and holding that there is no requirement
in the Act that the criminal conviction occur when the person is an alien); Stacher v.
Rosenberg, 216 F. Supp. 511 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (finding an alien who was a legal resident
for 50 years was nevertheless excludable after a short trip). Stacher was decided shortly
before Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
158. The Philippine Islands became a territory of the United States after the
Spanish-American War in 1898. People born in the Philippines were nationals, not citi-
zens of the United States. See Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904), for a discussion
of the Treaty of Paris. The status of Philippine natives as nationals of the United States
was recently challenged in Rabang v. INS, 35 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1994). The case was
dismissed over a strong dissent by Judge Pregerson.
159. Philippine Independence Act, ch. 84, 48 Stat. 456 (1934). The Act provided
for the independence of the Philippines by July 4, 1941. This, however, was delayed by
the Japanese invasion. The Philippine Islands became an independent nation on July 4,
1946. Proclamation No. 2645, 60 Stat. 1352 (1946).
160. See Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 639 (1954).
[VOL. 31: 911. 1994] Entry: What Mama Never Told You
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
later held that Philippine citizens who came to the continental
United States prior to the signing of the Act had not entered, 161 and
thus were immune from deportation on certain grounds.'62 Interest-
ingly, courts also held that Philippine citizens traveling to the United
States when the law went into effect did not enter.' 63
As one would assume, an alien is not normally considered to be
entering the United States when he or she travels from one part of
the United States to another.'64 However, difficulty may arise be-
cause the boundaries of the United States are defined by statute and
change from time to timel65 and purpose to purpose. 6 6 In addition,
the federal government can place different restrictions and require-
ments on travel to U.S. territories' than on travel to locations
within U.S. national boundaries. The effect of such control over a
territory can have interesting consequences when the territory in
question later becomes a state. For example, in 1907, a presidential
161. See Gonzales v. Barber, 207 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1953), affd, 347 U.S. 637
(1954) (holding that an alien convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude after "entry"
was not deportable because there was in fact no entry); Mangaoang v. Boyd, 205 F.2d
553 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 876 (1953) (holding that an alien who joined the
communist party after "entry" was not deportable because there was no entry); Del
Guercio v. Gabot, 161 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1947) (holding that a four-hour trip to Mexico
in 1934 was not an entry).
162. Some grounds did not require an entry, and Philippine citizens were not im-
mune from these grounds. See Rabang v. Boyd, 353 U.S. 427 (1957). Deportability
based upon a narcotics conviction applies to "any alien." Justice Douglass dissented, be-
lieving that entry must be read into the statute. Act of Feb. 18, 1931, ch. 224, 46 Stat.
1171, amended by Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, tit. II, § 21, 54 Stat. 670
(current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1988)). Accord Tugade v. Hoy, 265 F.2d 63
(9th Cir. 1959) (holding that narcotic drug conviction is grounds for deportation when a
former U.S. national is now classified as an alien); Resurreccion-Talavera v. Barber, 231
F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1956) (holding that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude
while a U.S. national is grounds for deportation if the convicted person makes an entry to
the United States after he is classified as an alien).
163. Vallejos v. Barber, 146 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. Cal. 1956). The court found that
the person was not coming from a foreign port or place.
164. See United States ex reL Alcantra v. Boyd, 222 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1955)
(traveling from the continental United States to Alaska is not an entry); United States v.
Paquet, 131 F. Supp. 32 (D. Haw. 1955) (traveling from Wake Island to Hawaii is not
an entry); In re T-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 201 (BIA 1956) (traveling from Hawaii to San
Francisco is normally not an entry, but the government has the power to control travel of
Philippinos in 1946).
165. See supra note 141.
166. Compare provisions relating to residency for naturalization, INA § 316, 8
U.S.C. § 1427 (1988) and INA § 101(a)(23), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(23) (1988), with the
definition of entry, INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1988).
167. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 212.1(e) (1994) (providing for less restrictive visa re-
quirements for citizens of certain neighboring countries visiting Guam than those re-
quired for visiting the rest of the United States) with 8 C.F.R. § 217 (1994) (Visa
Waiver Pilot Program).
proclamation prohibited the entry of Japanese and Korean laborers
from Hawaii.'68 In 1924, Hawaii became part of the United States
for entry purposes. 169 In spite of this, the courts held that an alien
resident of Hawaii could be prosecuted for an illegal entry into San
Francisco 170 or for overstaying a visa in California.'
The preceding discussion is but one example of how arbitrary the
laws relating to aliens may be. It also is an example of how different
treaties relating to different territories may affect entry analysis.
Travel from Puerto Rico to New York is not an entry,'7 2 although
travel to some trust territories may be considered a departure.17 3
And, of course, travel from Ellis Island1 4 to the mainland normally
was considered an entry.1
5
168. Exec. Orders No. 1907-EO-589 (March 14, 1907) and No. 1913-EO-1712
(Feb. 24, 1913), authorized by the Act of February 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898,
repealed by Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874.
169. See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153; see also Haymes v.
Brownell, 131 F. Supp. 784 (D.D.C. 1955) (traveling to Hawaii is not an entry).
170. Sugimoto v. Nagle, 38 F.2d 207 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 745 (1930).
Sugimoto legally entered Hawaii in 1907. Later that year he was smuggled into San
Francisco. In 1928, he left the United States, and was denied reentry because he had no
legal status in the United States. But see Del Guercio v. Gabot, 161 F.2d 559 (9th Cir.
1947) (having entered Hawaii legally in 1927, a four-hour trip to Mexico in 1934 did not
make his return to California an entry).
171. Matsuda v. Burnett, 68 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1933). A husband and wife first
entered Hawaii when it was an independent nation. They reentered, however, in 1916,
and the law in effect at that time was controlling. Id. at 274. Thus, when they came to
California in 1928, they were covered by the proclamation.
172. Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904) (holding that a native of Puerto
Rico in 1899, the year that the Treaty of Paris transferred Puerto Rico to the United
States, was not an alien, thus the immigration laws did not apply); Savoretti v. Voiler,
214 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1954) (holding that there was no entry when an individual trav-
elled from Puerto Rico to the United States); United States ex rel. Leon v. Murff, 250
F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1957) (holding that travel to Puerto Rico was not an entry); In re A-,
5 I. & N. Dec. 441 (BIA 1953) (holding that permission to travel from Puerto Rico to
New York was not necessary). The Virgin Islands are also part of the United States for
entry purposes. Rasmussen v. Robinson, 68 F. Supp. 930 (D.V.I. 1946) (holding that
travel from St. Martin, French West Indies to the U.S. Virgin Islands was an entry),
rev'd on other grounds, 163 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1947).
173. Aradanas v. Hogan, 155 F. Supp. 546 (D. Haw. 1957) (holding that travel to
Kwajalein Island as a contractor for the U.S. Navy was a departure); In re Reyes, 140 F.
Supp. 130 (D. Haw. 1956) (holding that trip to Kwajalein Island broke residency for
naturalization purposes). But see United States v. Paquet, 131 F. Supp. 32 (D. Haw.
1955) (holding that travel from Wake Island was not an entry because Wake Island is
part of the United States).
174. In effect, Ellis Island is a very large port of entry. See supra note 147.
175. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (hold-
ing that an alien kept on Ellis Island had not made an entry). But see United States ex
rel. La Barbera v. Commissioner of Immigration, 61 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1932) (holding
that an alien who escaped from Ellis Island entered the United States). Parole will be
discussed infra part VIII.
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An alien also may enter the United States if he or she intention-
ally and actually evades the nearest inspection point.'1 6 It is impor-
tant to note that an alien must intend to evade inspection. Thus, an
alien who crossed the Canadian border and sought the nearest immi-
gration post did not enter the United States without inspection.
17 7
Similarly, aliens who hid in the woods but did not run from immi-
gration officers did not enter the United States. 78 Also, an alien who
was found unconscious in a river did not have the necessary intent to
enter. 
79
In addition, the alien must actually evade inspection, if only for
brief moments. Thus, a Chinese national escaping a ship in Long
Island entered, even though he was caught a short time later. 8 0
However, an alien also must be free to mingle in society. 8' Thus,




When an immigration officer believes that an alien is excludable,
the officer may parole the alien into the United States for further
176. In re Pierre, 14 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 1973).
177. Thack v. Zurbrick, 51 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1931). The court stated, "if the
alien merely follows the ordinary path from the international line to the nearest inspec-
tion point and presents himself for inspection, his action in doing so cannot be an offense
for which Congress intended he should be sent to his former foreign residence and forbid-
den ever to try to return to this country." Id. at 635. The court did suggest that if the
alien blundered on the inspection point, the result would be different. Id. at 636. Cf In re
Rina, 15 I. & N. Dec. 453 (BIA 1975) (finding that aliens who were observed passing
the last clear sign of an inspection station could be prosecuted for illegal entry); In re
Estrada-Betancourt, 12 I. & N. Dec. 191 (BIA 1967) (deciding that an alien found on
what was not the reasonable route to an inspection point did enter).
178. Pierre v. Rivkind, 643 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Fla. 1986), rev'd on other grounds,
825 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1987). See also In re Phelisna, 551 F. Supp. 960 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (stating that the government had the burden of showing the alien did not intend to
make an entry where the alien had no idea where she was when she was picked up).
179. In re Yam, 16 I. & N. Dec. 535 (BIA 1978).
180. In re Chen, No. A72-763-158, Int. Dec. 3104 (July 20, 1993), reported in IJ
Terminates Exclusion Proceedings Against Chinese Man, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1133 (1993). But see In re G-, No. A72-761-974, Int. Dec. 3215 (Dec. 8, 1993), re-
ported in BIA Reaffirms Its View on Chinese Family Planning Asylum Issue, 71 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 155 (1994) (finding no evidence that the Chinese national involved
was ever free from official restraint).
181. Ex parte Chow Chok, 161 F. 627 (C.C.N.D.N.Y.), affd sub nom. Chow
Chok v. United States, 163 F. 1021 (2d Cir. 1908).
182. "In short, from the moment when they crossed the border, they were in the
actual, though not formal, custody of the inspectors." Id. at 630.
examination of the matter, criminal prosecution, or other public in-
terest reasons.'8 3 Under the immigration laws, that person has not
made an entry and is not within the United States. Unless a specific
law is passed allowing parolees to remain in the United States,8 4 the
parolee must leave the United States once the purpose of his parole
is complete.18 This holds true no matter how long the parolee physi-
cally remains in the United States. 6 In addition, the parolee can
receive no benefit from his presence in the United States unless spe-
cifically provided by statute. Thus, an alien could not derive citizen-
ship 1 7 or apply for relief available in deportation proceedings. 18 An
alien can be paroled into the United States for a particular purpose
or for a specific length of time. 89
Although there is little case law on the matter, it is unlikely that
183. See INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1988).
184. For example, the Chinese Student Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
404, 106 Stat. 1969, allows Chinese nationals paroled into the United States to apply for
certain immigration benefits and remain in the United States permanently.
185. There are certain exceptions contained within the law. For example, a parolee
who marries a U.S. citizen may be eligible to remain permanently in the United States.
See INA § 245(a), (c), (d), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), (d), (e) (1988).
186. The prime modern examples are those cases involving the so-called Marielito
Cubans who were deemed excludable due to criminal convictions in Cuba. Most of these
individuals entered in the early 1980s and are still on parolee status. As Cuba refuses to
accept these individuals, it seems unlikely that their status problem will be solved soon.
As criminally excludable aliens, many of these individuals are in custody and have no
likely chance of release. See supra note 27. There are also other examples. See Kaplan v.
Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925) (holding that a girl found feeble-minded in 1914 was still
excludable in 1923 in spite of naturalization of her father in 1920); United States ex rel.
Lue Chow Yee v. Shaughnessy, 146 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), affd, 245 F.2d 874 (2d
Cir. 1957) (finding aliens who attempted entry in 1949 were not within the United States
so they could apply for relief from deportation in 1957); United States ex rel. Tom We
Shung v. Murff, 176 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), a~fd per curiam, 274 F.2d 667 (2d
Cir. 1960) (holding that there was no entry where an alien was paroled in to the U.S. to
determine qualifications for a World War II Act and remained here through 11 years of
litigation); In re Cenatice, 16 I. & N. Dec. 162 (BIA 1977) (holding that an alien in
custody from time of landing did not enter).
187. Kaplan, 267 U.S. at 228; Zartarian v. Billings, 204 U.S. 170 (1907) (holding
that a child with trachoma whose father was naturalized was not "dwelling in the United
States" such that he could obtain derivative benefits); United States ex rel. Patton v.
Tod, 297 F. 385 (2d Cir. 1924), cert. dismissed, 267 U.S. 607 (1925) (holding that a
child found feeble-minded in 1914 had no domicile in United States and could not bene-
fit from father's naturalization); United States ex rel. De Rienzo v. Rodgers, 185 F. 334
(3d Cir. 1911) (holding that a feeble-minded child could not derive benefit from father's
naturalization); United States ex rel. Fink v. Tod, 1 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1924), rev'd, 267
U.S. 571 (1925) (holding that a deaf and feeble-minded child who came to the United
States in 1914 derived no benefit from her long stay in the United States).
188. Compare INA § 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1988) (regarding the exclusion of
aliens) with INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1988) (regarding the deportation of aliens).
See also Lue Chow Yee, 146 F. Supp. at 3; Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185
(1958) (holding that a paroled alien was not eligible to apply for relief under INA
§ 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988)).
189. A common example of an alien paroled in for a purpose is an alien paroled
into the United States to be prosecuted for a crime and serve a prison sentence. See
Schuldreich v. INS, No. B-93-93, (S.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 1993), reported in Extradition
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an alien paroled into the United States can make an entry by violat-
ing his or her status.190 The courts seem reluctant to grant an alien
more rights by violating the law.' 91 Thus, an alien who remains in
the United States beyond the expiration of his or her parole has not
entered the United States and remains in parole status.1
92
Parole and entry often are only a razor's edge apart. For example,
an alien who was inspected but escaped from a non-Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) waiting area was found to have en-
tered,193 yet an alien who absconded from an INS detention facility
did not enter. 94 The distinction relies upon the status of the alien
before the escape. In the first instance, the alien's inspection had
Treaty Affords Alien Right to Depart Voluntarily, Court Holds, 70 INTERPRETER RE-
LEASES 1562 (1993) (paroled in from Australia for criminal prosecution); In re Badala-
menti, 19 I. & N. Dec. 623 (BIA 1988) (paroled in for criminal prosecution from
Spain). Occasionally, if an alien does not appear eligible to enter the United States, but
the officer reasonably believes that the alien can gather the necessary evidence, the alien
will be paroled for a length of time and required to appear at an immigration office with
the proof of qualification for admission. Usually parole is granted for a specific purpose
and for a specific time.
190. An alien can be "admitted" by her local Immigration Service inspection unit
without leaving the United States.
191. This is an intriguing position of the courts which ignores the fact that the
immigration laws provide legal benefits to those who enter the country illegally. See
supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text. The cases suggest that the courts confuse im-
migration parole with its more commonly known cousin, parole from jail. The position
has been widely accepted by the Attorney General and Board of Immigration Appeals.
See supra note 189.
192. In re L- Y- Y-, 9 1. & N. Dec. 70 (BIA, A.G. 1960); Siu Fung Luk v.
Rosenberg, 409 F.2d 555 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 396 U.S. 801 (1969). The court in
Siu Fung Luk suggests that an alien must be admitted by the Immigration Service in
some way. The court's analysis is not very strong, relying on the moral imperative that
an alien should not be rewarded for violating his status. Id. at 558. Note that termination
of parole status may not be enough to create an entry. In re Badalamenti, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 623 (BIA 1988) (holding that an alien paroled in for prosecution, acquitted, and
given seven days to depart had not entered in spite of the completion of the object of
parole); Schuldriech v. INS, No. B-93-93 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 1993), reported in Extradi-
tion Treaty Affords Alien Right to Depart Voluntarily, Court Holds, 70 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1562 (1993) (holding that an alien who had his parole formally terminated in
front of an immigration judge was still properly in exclusion proceedings). But see In re
Barragan-Garibay, 15 I. & N. Dec. 77 (BIA 1974) (holding that where an alien was
paroled in but tried for illegal entry, the government was estopped from holding that
there was no entry).
193. In re Ching & Chen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 203 (BIA 1984). See also In re A-, 9 I.
& N. Dec. 356 (BIA 1961) (holding that an alien detained on a ship but who escaped
had entered).
194. In re Lin, 18 I. & N. Dec. 219 (BIA 1982). The alien was deemed to be in
the same position as if he had been paroled into the United States and then escaped
custody.
been completed. In the second, he was deemed paroled into the
United States.
195
IX. TRADITIONAL SEA LAW AND ENTRY
One of the most complex areas of entry law analysis has involved
aliens who served aboard ships. Courts found the immigration laws
had to interact with traditional sea law 96 as well as with other trea-
ties, policies, and concerns.
An example of this interplay of interests can be found in Weedin
v. Banzo Okada.'97 Okada entered the United States unlawfully in
1917.19s In 1921, Okada joined the crew of a U.S. ship and landed
briefly in a foreign port. 9 9 Upon his return to the United States, the
government argued that Okada had made a new entry and was sub-
ject to deportation as an alien without documents.2 00 However, the
court, looking at traditional sea law, found that Okada had not left
the United States because the U.S. ship was considered to be on
U.S. soil for residency and other purposes. 201 Since the statute of
limitations20 2 ran from the date of the prohibited entry, Okada was
not deportable.20 3 This reasoning was applied to other cases involving
aliens who had been fishing in foreign waters.2 04
The Supreme Court affirmed the use of traditional sea law to find
that there had been no entry in United States ex rel. Claussen v.
Day.20 5 The case involved a Danish seaman who sailed to South
America. Upon his return to the United States, he pled guilty to
195. Again, this seems to ignore the benefits given to those making illegal entries
into the United States. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
196. As a non-admiralty law attorney, I beg forgiveness for any incorrect terminol-
ogy used in this section.
197. 2 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1924).
198. At the time, an alien could be deported for unlawful entry only within five
years of that entry. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874. The alien had no
official status, however, and could be deported for other reasons.
199. Banzo Okada, 2 F.2d at 321.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 322. See also Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (de-
ciding that a permanent resident who was screened and passed by the Coast Guard to
serve on a ship could not be excluded without the due process available in deportation
proceedings).
202. See the discussion of statute of limitations in Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291,
297 (1914).
203. Banzo Okada, 2 F.2d at 322. See also Ex parte Kogi Saito, 18 F.2d 116
(W.D. Wa. 1927) (holding that an illegal alien on a U.S. ship was a resident of that
ship's home port, and, as such, could not have "departed" the United States).
204. Ex parte Nagata, 11 F.2d 178 (S.D. Cal. 1926) (fishing in Mexican waters);
Ex parte Kogi Saito, 18 F.2d at 116 (cook on trips between Washington and British
Columbia); Matsutaka v. Carr, 47 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1931) (fishing in foreign waters).
205. 279 U.S. 398 (1929).
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manslaughter and was charged with having committed a crime in-
volving moral turpitude within five years of entry.20 6 The Court held
that there had been no entry,207 but also narrowed the grounds in
which a seaman could ship out safely.20 s
The Supreme Court also attempted to clarify the definition of en-
try in United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith.0 Volpe involved a per-
manent resident alien who pled guilty to counterfeiting in 1925. He
visited Cuba briefly in 1928. Volpe was then charged with being an
alien who, prior to entry, had been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude.2 10 Volpe argued that the immigration laws referred
to his first entry as a permanent resident. The Court disagreed, stat-
ing that an entry "includes any coming of an alien from a foreign
country into the United States whether such coming be the first or
any subsequent one."
'211
The combination of the Volpe and Claussen decisions led to some
strange decisions regarding seamen. Suddenly, it became important
that the alien not leave the ship.21 2 Even unintentional landings
could cause problems. 213 Eventually, even remaining on a ship was
206. Id. at 400. The manslaughter charge would not fall within this five-year pe-
riod if the trip to South America was not considered a departure from and entry to the
United States.
207. "There is no such entry where one goes to sea on an American vessel from a
port of the United States and returns to the same or another port of this country without
having been in any foreign port or place." Id. at 401. See also United States ex rel.
Alcantra v. Boyd, 222 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1955) (traveling from continental United
States to Alaska is not an entry).
208. Claussen, 279 U.S. at 401. Lower courts were quick to find that an alien
could not land at any foreign port or place and still be found not to have made an entry.
See United States ex rel. Schlimmgen v. Jordan, 164 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1947); see also
United States ex rel. Stapf v. Corsi, 287 U.S. 129 (1932) (finding an illegal alien sailor
who spent less than three days in Germany entered the United States on his return).
209. 289 U.S. 422 (1933).
210. Id. at 423-24.
211. Id. at 425. The Court was responding to the controversy over the change in
the immigration laws from applying most grounds of excludability to "aliens" instead of
to "alien immigrants." See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Schlimmgen v. Jordan, 164 F.2d 633 (7th Cir.
1947) (holding that a four-hour visit to Havana was sufficient for entry). But see Mat-
sutaka v. Carr, 47 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1931) (holding that an illegal alien who shipped
out on an American vessel may reenter the United States in spite of Claussen).
213. See, e.g., Taguchi v. Carr, 62 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1932). In Taguchi, an alien
illegally in the United States signed aboard a fishing vessel. While in Mexican waters, a
storm caused the ship to hit another vessel and sink. Taguchi was stranded on an unin-
habited Mexican island but was soon picked up by a U.S. tug. Taguchi had no intention
of landing in Mexico. The court found that Taguchi assumed the risk that he might be
shipwrecked. Thus, he had sufficient volition for the court to find a departure and entry.
no guarantee that a new entry would not be found.214
As with other entry analysis, specific treaties and laws could affect
the status of returning seamen. Two early cases are interesting. Both
Case of the Chinese Cabin Waiter215 and its companion Case of the
Chinese Laborers on Shipboard216 involved Chinese citizens who
shipped out on U.S. vessels. In Cabin Waiter, the aliens did not leave
the ship when it reached foreign ports; in Laborers, the aliens spent
a few hours in Sydney, Australia. In both cases, the question
presented was whether the Chinese Exclusion Act of 188221" barred
the reentry of these individuals. The court examined sea law, which
required a ship to return its seamen to the port where they signed
on, 18 and considered the congressional intent behind the Exclusion
Act 219 to determine that these aliens could, in fact, reenter the
United States.220
X. COMMUNISTS AND ENTRY
In 1952, Congress passed laws providing for the exclusion and de-
portation of aliens who, after an entry, had been members of the
Communist Party.2 21 Generally, the courts were very willing to find
the entry necessary to deport the alien,222 although a few aliens were
214. United States ex rel. Roovers v. Kessler, 90 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1937) (hold-
ing that an alien who shipped out on advice of an INS officer made a new entry although
he did not leave the ship).
215. 13 F. 286 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
216. 13 F. 291 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
217. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, repealed by Act of Dec.
17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600 (quoted in Cabin Waiter, 13 F. at 286-87). It barred the
importation of Chinese laborers to the United States. See PAUL R. EHRLICH ET AL.. THE
GOLDEN DOOR: INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, MEXICO. AND THE UNITED STATES 55-58
(1974), for a discussion of the various exclusion acts.
218. Cabin Waiter, 13 F. at 289.
219. According to the court, the congressional intent was to prevent race wars. The
Chinese already in the United States were a small enough number that they could settle
into' the community. Id.
220. Id. at 290; Laborers, 13 F. at 295.
221. This was later changed to include aliens who at any time had been a Commu-
nist. See Klig v. Brownell, 244 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1957), vacated as moot sub nom.
Klig v. Rogers, 355 U.S. 605 (1958). See also constitutional cases on this issue: Harisia-
des v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
222. See Fougherouse v. Brownell, 163 F. Supp. 580 (D. Or. 1958) (holding that
an alien's illegal entry in 1924 was sufficient to properly place him in deportation pro-
ceedings where he became a member of the Communist Party during his U.S. residency,
then departed the United States, and subsequently immigrated in 1940); United States
ex rel. Belfrage v. Kenton, 131 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), afid, 224 F.2d 803 (2d
Cir. 1955) (holding first entry into United States was controlling for purposes of deporta-
tion proceedings where the alien was a member of the Communist Party subsequent to
first entry but was not a member of the Communist Party subsequent to last entry). But
see Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939) (holding deportation of an alien invalid when
the alien joined a Communist Party after entry).
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saved by treaty rights.223 In a very interesting case, however, the Su-
preme Court avoided the deportation of one such alien.224
Mr. Bonetti entered the United States as a permanent resident in
1923. He was an active member of the Communist Party between
1932 and 1936.225 In 1937, Bonetti travelled to Spain to fight in the
Spanish Civil War 228 as a member of the Abraham Lincoln Bri-
221gade, giving up his permanent residency in the process. He re-
turned to the United States in 1938, reimmigrated, and made a one-
day trip to Mexico in 1939.228 The lower court held that, for
purposes of the statute, entry did not mean last entry,229 but any
entry.230 Thus, Bonetti was deportable.
The Supreme Court held that the 1923 entry was a legal entry,
but not the controlling entry for purposes of the statute.23 l Instead,
the last lawful entry was the governing one.23 2 The dissent com-
plained that the majority's decision crippled the effectiveness of the
statute.
2 33
What is interesting about the Supreme Court's decision is that the
majority was clearly impressed with Bonetti's motivation to travel to
Spain. The majority noted that Bonetti fought in Spain because he
thought that if the Rome-Berlin Axis was not stopped it would lead
to world war.234 Thus, again, we see the influence of outside consid-
erations on entry law analysis.23 5
223. Cf Philippine cases discussed supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text. See
also Kessler, 307 U.S. at 22. But see In re M-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 569 (BIA 1951) (finding
entry in 1926 is entry under Act of 1918 Communist provisions).
224. Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691 (1958). Cf Belfrage, 131 F. Supp. at 576.
225. Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. at 692.
226. Id. The Spanish Civil War was fought between the Fascists (who were sup-
ported by Nazi Germany and Italy) and the Republicans. See generally GERALD BRE-
NAN. THE SPANISH LABYRINTH, AN ACCOUNT OF THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
BACKGROUND OF THE CIVIL WAR (1960).
227. Bonetti v. Brownell, 240 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1956), rev'd sub. nom. Bonetti
v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691 (1958). The Abraham Lincoln Brigade supported the Republi-
can forces. Both were romanticized in Ernest Hemingway's book For Whom the Bell
Tolls (1940). See generally CECIL EBY, BETWEEN THE BULLET AND THE LIE: AMERICAN
VOLUNTEERS IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR (1969). Interestingly, the brigade was founded
by the Communist Party of the United States. Id. at 5.
228. Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. at 693.
229. See supra notes 35-46 for contrary holdings.
230. Bonetti v. Brownell, 240 F.2d at 625.
231. Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. at 697.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 702.
234. Id. at 692 n.2.
235. The law was later changed to make deportable aliens who at any time were
Communists. See supra note 221.
XI. FLEUTI DOCTRINE
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Rosenberg v. Fleuti,230 a
permanent resident who traveled abroad was subject to virtually all
the same risks of deportation as a nonimmigrant.237 After Fleuti,
permanent residents could be found not to have entered the United
States if they could establish that their trip abroad was "innocent,
casual, and brief. 238 Fleuti involved a permanent resident who trav-
eled to Mexico for a few hours. Upon his return, he was ordered
deported as an alien with a "psychopathic personality," the term
then used to describe homosexuals.239 The Supreme Court found it a
violation of due process to subject a permanent resident to deporta-
tion after a trip that could not reasonably be expected to interrupt
the alien's residence in the United States.240 The Fleuti doctrine has
since been codified, 241 and similar language has been applied to vari-
ous benefit programs.242 However, courts have been unwilling to ex-
tend Fleuti to situations Congress has not specifically addressed.243
Application of the Fleuti doctrine has been broken down by the
courts into an analysis of whether the foreign trip was innocent, cas-
ual, and brief, and whether the trip was intended to be meaningfully
interruptive of an alien's residency. The courts have been very busy
interpreting these simple sounding words.
Normally, a trip is innocent and casual if it involves little or no
236. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
237. See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
238. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 462.
239. Id. at 451.
240. Id. at 460.
241. INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(13) (1988).
242. See, e.g., INA § 245A(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3)(B) (1988) (relating
to the eligibility of individuals for the so-called amnesty program). Litigation of this
provision and others continues to the present. See INS v. Legalization Assistance Project
of Los Angeles County Fed'n of Labor, 114 S. Ct. 594 (1993) (remanding to the Ninth
Circuit for further consideration of jurisdictional and merits issues).
243. See Mendoza v. INS, 16 F.3d 335 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that Fleuti was
not applicable to illegal aliens); Castillo-Magallon v. INS, 729 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1984)
(holding the court had no jurisdiction to hear exclusion appeal); Kabongo v. INS, 837
F.2d 753 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982 (1988) (deciding that Fleuti did not
apply to aliens on student visas); Kasbati v. District Director of INS, 805 F. Supp. 619
(N.D. Ill. 1992) (finding that an alien involved in a class action lawsuit challenging INS
administration of amnesty program was not protected by Fleuti); In re Del Rosario, 13 1.
& N. Dec. 324 (BIA 1969) (finding that a nonimmigrant was not entitled to protection
of Fleuti); In re Legaspi, 11 1. & N. Dec. 819 (BIA 1966) (deciding that an out-of-
status alien was not entitled to protection of Fleuti).
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planning and is for a legal purpose.244 Thus, attending a family din-
ner245 or paying a condolence call 246 in a Mexican border town are
considered innocent and casual. The more planning a trip takes,
however, the more likely a trip will not be innocent and casual. 247 A
trip planned for five years may not be considered innocent and cas-
ual, 24  nor may business trips generally.2 49 Trips to facilitate alien
smuggling or other illegal purposes also are not innocent and
casual.250
The precise length of a "brief" trip is not clear and can be af-
fected by events occurring after departure.251 In theory, most courts
244. See, e.g., In re Hoffman-Arvayo, 13 I. & N. Dec. 750 (BIA 1971) (holding
that weekend trips to visit family were brief, casual, and innocent); In re Cardenas-
Pinedo, 10 I. & N. Dec. 341 (BIA 1963) (holding that a few hours' trip to Mexico was
brief, casual, and innocent). However, travel for a legal purpose may be meaningfully
interruptive even if the trip is brief. Trips to sign a bond book in Mexico were meaning-
fully interruptive, even though they usually involved only a few hours. In re Caudillo-
Villalobos, 11 1. & N. Dec. 15 (BIA 1965), affd sub nom. Caudillo-Villalobos v. INS,
361 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1966); In re Acosta, 14 I. & N. Dec. 666 (BIA 1974) (holding
that an alien who went once a week to Mexico to sign a bond book and who was arrested
and held in Mexico for six months did not have a brief trip); In re Wood, 12 I. & N.
Dec. 170 (BIA 1967) (traveling to Canada to pursue a legal matter was meaningfully
interruptive).
245. See Laredo-Miranda v. INS, 555 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1977).
246. Vargas-Banuelos v. INS, 466 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1972).
247. See In re Quintanilla-Quintanilla, 11 I. & N. Dec. 432 (BIA 1965) (holding
that a pilgrimage trip and visit to family was brief, casual, and innocent in spite of the
length of planning). Sometimes, the courts will use the term "meaningfully interruptive"
instead of "innocent and casual."
248. Munoz-Casarez v. INS, 511 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Janati-Ataie, 14
I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA, A.G. 1972) (planning a one month trip to Iran is meaningfully
interruptive).
249. Dabone v. Karn, 763 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding business trips not
brief, casual, and innocent); In re Nakoi, 14 I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 1972) (holding a
trip to teach for nine months was not casual even though the trip in fact lasted only three
months).
250. Solis-Davila v. INS, 456 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1972) (express purpose of trip
was to smuggle aliens into U.S.); Pimental-Navarro v. Del Guercio, 256 F.2d 877 (9th
Cir. 1958) (pre-Fleuti case holding that there was a new entry when an alien left to help
smuggle aliens); In re Baldovinos, 14 I. & N. Dec. 438 (BIA 1973) (smuggling aliens
was meaningfully interruptive); In re Corral-Fragoso, 11 1. & N. Dec. 478 (BIA 1966)
(helping aliens after leaving United States was still meaningfully interruptive); Martin-
Mendoza v. INS, 499 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113 (1975)
(finding multiple trips to facilitate alien smuggling was meaningfully interruptive); In re
Leal, 15 1. & N. Dec. 477 (BIA 1975) (determining that a trip made expressly to de-
fraud INS was meaningfully interruptive); In re Payan, 14 I. & N. Dec. 58 (BIA 1972)
(deciding that a trip to smuggle aliens was meaningfully interruptive); In re Valencia-
Barajas, 13 I. & N. Dec. 369 (BIA 1969) (finding a brief trip to smuggle aliens was
meaningfully interruptive); In re Alvarez-Verduzco, 11 1. & N. Dec. 625 (BIA 1966)
(smuggling heroin for own use was meaningfully interruptive).
251. Pre-Fleuti cases have long examined brief trips abroad. See, e.g., United
hold that if the trip is of short duration,5 2 or if the trip is contingent
upon events reasonably expected to happen in a short period of time,
the trip is brief.253 However, no matter the reason, an absence of
seventeen years was found not to be brief,25 4 and there is even some
question whether month-long trips are brief.
255
Often courts will lump together their analysis of the "innocent,
casual, and brief" elements with their analysis of whether the trip
was "'intended' as a departure disruptive of his resident alien sta-
tus. '256 Generally, leaving the United States for the purpose of fur-
thering or committing a crime is meaningfully interruptive. 5 7
Likewise, trips that take planning may be meaningfully interruptive.
Thus, an alien who left to get married,258 as well as an alien who left
on business trips,2 59 involved aliens found to have made new entries
States ex rel. Lesto v. Day, 21 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1927) (holding that an alien's intent to
make a temporary trip was controlling); United States ex rel. Alther v. McCandless, 46
F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1931) (holding that an alien's intent prior to departure was
controlling).
252. See Maldonado-Sandoval v. United States INS, 518 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1975)
(holding that a two to three day trip was brief); In re Hoffman-Arvayo, 13 I. & N. Dec.
750 (BIA 1971) (holding that weekend trips were brief); In re Cardenas-Pinedo, 10 I. &
N. Dec. 341 (BIA 1963) (holding that a few hours' trip was brief).
253. See Chavez-Ramirez v. INS, 792 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a
trip must take a short time or be contingent on events reasonably expected to occur
within a short period of time); Angeles v. District Director, 729 F. Supp. 479 (D. Md.
1990) (holding that caring for parents in the Philippines between 10 and II months each
year was not brief). But see In re Acosta, 14 I. & N. Dec. 666 (BIA 1974) (holding that
an alien who went once a week to Mexico to sign a bond book, and who was arrested and
held in Mexico for six months, did not have a brief trip).
254. Gamero v. INS, 367 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1966). See also In re Salazar, 17 I.
& N. Dec. 167 (BIA 1979) (holding that five-month trip was meaningfully interruptive).
255. Munoz-Casarez v. INS, 511 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Janati-Ataie, 14
I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA, A.G. 1972) (holding that extensive planning for a one-month
trip to Iran was meaningfully interruptive); In re Abi-Rached, 10 I. & N. Dec. 551 (BIA
1964) (holding that a one-month trip to Mexico was meaningfully interruptive).
256. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963).
257. Martin-Mendoza v. INS, 499 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1113 (1975); Maldonaldo-Sandoval v. United States INS, 518 F.2d 278 (9th Cir.
1975) (holding that when an immigration judge presiding over an exclusion hearing de-
termines that an individual is a permanent resident and has made a brief departure,
exclusion should be terminated and deportation proceedings started; and finding that ille-
gality of the permanent residency is irrelevant to Fleuti analysis in that case). Compare
In re Rangel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 789 (BIA 1976) (irrelevant for Fleuti analysis) with In re
Castillo-Pineda, 15 I. & N. Dec. 274 (BIA 1975) (holding that a marriage that was the
basis of immigration and that was subsequently declared void ab initio destroyed the
basis for entry).
258. Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1974). The court looked at the
alien's intent at the time of departure and found that the alien could have formed a
domicile elsewhere. But see Jubilado v. United States, 819 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1987)
(deciding that a permanent resident who traveled to the Philippines for three months in
order to bring his wife and children to the United States did not intend to interrupt his
residency).
259. See Dabone v. Karn, 763 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1985). But see Itzcovitz v. Selec-
tive Serv. Local Bd. No. 6, 447 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1971) (declaring that a three-week
business training course was not sufficient for an entry).
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when they returned to the United States.
Courts have split over whether the permanent resident in question
must have formed the intent to interrupt residency before he or she
leaves the United States. While most circuits hold that the time the
intent is formed to do something meaningfully interruptive is irrele-
vant,260 some circuits have held that the intent must be formed
before departing the United States.26' Courts have also split on
whether an entry without inspection,262 with nothing more, is suffi-
cient to be a meaningfully interruptive act.26
260. See Molina v. Sewell, 983 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that an alien
must intend, at the time of departure, that the trip be meaningfully interruptive);
Laredo-Miranda v. INS, 555 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that an alien attending
dinner in Mexico who forgot his residency card and crossed the Rio Grande twice to
assist other aliens in entering the United States illegally, participated in activity that was
meaningfully interruptive); Yanez-Jacquez v. INS, 440 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1971) (hold-
ing that where there was no intent to interrupt stay before departure, there was no en-
try); Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1974) (smuggling 55 pounds of marijuana
was meaningfully interruptive, and intent to interrupt residency was irrelevant); In re
Vargas-Banuelos, 13 I. & N. Dec. 810 (BIA 1971) (holding that condolence call was
"transformed" to a meaningfully interruptive trip by assisting aliens across the border).
Cf. Zimmerman v. Lehmann, 339 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965)
(holding that where a permanent resident made a brief trip to Canada claiming to be a
U.S. citizen by adoption, if claim was not fraudulent, there was no entry). See discussion
of Jubilado v. United States, 819 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1987), supra note 258.
261. Plasencia v. Sureck, 637 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (holding that the issue of entry is jurisdictional, to be
decided by the immigration judge - the Ninth Circuit had held that there could be an
entry only if the departure was meaningfully interruptive); Vargas-Banuelos v. INS, 466
F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that an alien paying condolence call who was talked
into helping his cousin enter the United States illegally had not entered, because he did
not intend his trip to be meaningfully interruptive when he left the United States). Cf. In
Re Vargas-Banuelos, 13 I. & N. Dec. 810 (BIA 1971). This conflict has yet to be re-
solved. See Rosendo-Ramirez v. INS, 32 F.3d 1085 (7th Cir. 1994) (refusing to apply
Fifth Circuit law on intent issue).
262. An entry without inspection is a federal crime and is a ground for deporta-
tion. INA § 241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988). This includes making a false claim to
U.S. citizenship as well as crossing a U.S. border in an unauthorized manner. See In re
Kolk, 11 1. & N. Dec. 103 (BIA 1965) (holding that a false claim to citizenship was
entry without inspection); In re Karl, 10 I. & N. Dec. 480 (BIA 1964) (holding that a
false claim to U.S. citizenship after a 10-day vacation created a new entry). This conflict
has yet to be resolved.
263. Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939, 946 (7th Cir. 1993) (entry without
inspection is a new entry); In re Kolk, 111. & N. Dec. 103 (BIA 1965) (Fleuti exception
does not apply to entry without inspection); In re Rina, 15 I. & N. Dec. 346 (BIA 1975)
(Fleuti exception does not apply to entry without inspection); Ferraro v. INS, 535 F.2d
208 (2d Cir. 1976) (remanded to BIA to determine Fleuti issue).
CONCLUSION
The definition of entry seems simple until one tries to explain it.
Exceptions to the determination of entry that are based upon histori-
cal events, state of mind, age, and other policy considerations illus-
trate that entry analysis can be as complex and fascinating as any
other area of immigration law. As a microcosm of the immigration
laws, entry analysis demonstrates the very political nature of immi-
gration and just how often historical events rather than reasoned
thought can affect both statutory and case law development.
